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TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANTS:
A NEW EQUATION FOR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
EDWARD F. MAHEK*
F EDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS may now obtain a search warrant
without the affiant personally appearing before the issuing judicial officer.
Rule 41(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, authorizes a
magistrate to issue a search warrant based upon sworn oral testimony
communicated by telephone or other appropriate means "[i]f the circumstan-
ces make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit."' Federal
investigative agents and attorneys2 can now simply telephone or radio a
magistrate and contemporaneously obtain a search warrant. 3 The Supreme
Court and Congress sought to make obtaining a search warrant "administra-
tively feasible" when circumstances and administrative obstacles make it
difficult to timely obtain one through the traditional method of requiring the
affiant to personally appear before a magistrate.4 This 1977 amendment is
consistent with the Supreme Court's oft-stated position which favors the use
of search warrants except in limited situations.5 Significantly, a search
warrant not only interjects a third party to determine the existence of
probable cause, but also defines and limits the object of the search and the
* B.S., Ohio University; J.D., Case Western Reserve University; Federal Public Defender for
the Northern District of Ohio; Adjunct Faculty, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University.
FED. R. Ciua.P. 41(c)(2)(A). Additionally, Rule 41(c) provides, inter alia:
(C) Issuance.-If the Federal[sic] magistrate is satisfied that the circumstances are
such as to make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit and that grounds for the
application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, the Federal
magistrate shall order the issuance of a warrant by directing the person requesting the
warrant to sign the Federal magistrate's name on the duplicate original warrant....
(G) Motion to suppress precluded.-Absent a finding of bad faith, evidence
obtained pursuant to a warrant issued under this paragraph is not subject to a motion to
suppress on the ground that the circumstances were not such as to make it reasonable to
dispense with a written affidavit.
Effective October 1, 1977.
2 The issuance of search warrants authorized under Rule 41 is limited to either "a federal law
enforcement officer or an attorney for the government." Fmn. R. CWIM. P. 41(a).
I At least two other jurisdictions have authorized telephonic search warrants. CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1526(b), 1528(b) (West Supp. 1974); ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1444(c), 13-1445(c) (Supp.
1973). See, FED. R. CtuM. P. 41, 18 U.S.C.A., Notes of Advisory Comm. on Rules, at 46 (Supp.
1978).
4 FED. R. Cum. P. 41, 18 U.S.C.A., Notes of Advisory Comm. on Rules, at 46 (Supp. 1978).
5 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) is a relatively recent example of the Court's
preference for search warrants. In Coolidge, Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, said:
[T]he most basic constitutional rule . . . is that "searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are perse unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." The exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn," and there
must be "a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative." "[T]he burden is on those seeking the
exemption to show the need for it."
Id., at 454-55 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357; Jones v. United States, 347 U.S.
493, 499; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456).
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property to be seized.6 Therefore, the probable cause justification and, as
importantly, the scope of the search are not determined by law enforcement
officers "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
7
Once a statement of probable cause is submitted to the magistrate, it is
recorded and kept on file with the court.8 This statement, whether in support
of a telephonic or traditional warrant, 9 serves as a basis for a later judicial
determination of its legality. The scope of the area searched and items seized
may be examined in relation to the warrant.10
The availability of a telephonic search warrant affects most directly the
body of decisional authority permitting warrantless searches where exigent
circumstances exist. Most commonly the exception is in issue in searches of
movable vehicles, such as automobiles and airplanes, and luggage at
transportation terminals. It also has impact to a lesser extent on the question
of whether a search warrant is required - absent exigent circumstances - to
search a private dwelling in order to arrest an individual for whom an arrest
warrant exists or where there is probable cause to believe an individual has
committed a felony.
The availability of a telephonic or radio-obtained search warrant has
changed the equation used by the courts in determining the exigency of a
given situation which is claimed to justify a warrantless search. This Article
will examine the change in the exigent circumstances equation. It will also
focus on the impact of Rule 41(c)(2) on judicial remedies for warrantless
searches. These remedies include suppression on traditional Fourth
Amendment grounds, as well as the use of a federal court's supervisory power
over the administration of criminal justice.
I. SEARcHis FoR OBjEcTs
The courts have fashioned an exigent circumstances exception to the
Fourth Amendment requirement of a search warrant where there exists an
immediate need to search for objects in order to avoid the risk of loss of
evidence, and where obtaining a timely search warrant by the traditional
method of an affilant appearing before a magistrate would, in effect, be
unreasonable because of conditions then existing.1 The lapse of time in
obtaining the warrant and the unavailability of a magistrate or state judge
have been the usual obstacles.12 Other related factors considered in granting
6 "Once a lawful search has begun, it is . . . far more likely that it will not exceed proper
bounds when it is done pursuant to a judicial authorization 'particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.' " United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9
(1977).
7 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
1 FEn. R. CraM. P. 41(c)(2)(E).
9 Fm. R. CraM. P. 41(c)(2)(E).
"0 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
12 See, e.g., Thomas v. Parett, 524 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d
536 (9th Cir. 1973). Both Thomas and Ogden are cases involving the seizure of drugs by law
enforcement officers. In Thomas, the exigent circumstances exception justified the police in
raiding an apartment without first obtaining a search warrant, where the defendants had
processed heroin and were about to leave with the completed product. Similarly, in Ogden, the
[Vol. 27:35
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the exception are: the time of day or night of the search; the lapse of time
between obtaining probable cause and executing the search;13 the distance
from a magistrate; the number of agents available on the scene and the
number available to assist those on the scene;14 the mobility of the property
to be searched;' 5 and, the location, identity and custodial status of the sus-
pect, accomplices, or owner of the property to be searched.'6
The most expansive application of the exigent circumstances exception
has been in cases where there existed an immediate need to search to identify
and apprehend the suspects of a recent crime. A sufficient exigent
circumstance which justifies a warrantless search has been found to be present
when, for example, an instrumentality, such as a get-away car, is searched
moments after a crime has occurred in order to enable the authorities to
quickly locate the perpetrators of the crime.
1 7
The presence or absence of one or more of these factors is generally
determinative of whether a search warrant should or could have been timely
obtained prior to a warrantless search and seizure of objects or documents.' 8
Some of these factors are more dominant than others. In a situation where
the object to be searched is a mobile vehicle in a public place, and sufficient
law officers are available to obtain a warrant as well as guard the property,
generally, no risk of loss exists. Thus, there is no exigency and a warrant is
exception justified a federal agent in searching an airline passenger's baggage which smelled of
marijuana. The court stated that, "[w]here the exigencies of time and the possible removal of the
contraband to another state create an emergency, no warrant is required." 485 F.2d at 540.
13 United States v. Free, 437 F.2d 631,634-35 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Free, the arresting officers
discovered the appellant's auto while cruising in the general vicinity of the assault with which
Free was subsequently charged. Only forty-five minutes elapsed between the commission of the
crime and the arrest of Free and the search of his auto.
11 In United Statesv. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9thCir. 1974), the court seemed to emphasize
the fact that six secret service agents entered McCormick's house, placing him in custody
immediately. However, the relevance of the number of agents may have been limited to
whether McCormick's auto, the object of a subsequent search, was within his immediate control
and therefore subject to being rapidly removed by the appellant. After considering the number
of agents at the scene, the court said, "[m]oreover, even if he could have gained access to his car,
he could not have driven it away, because a police car was blocking the driveway." Id., at 287.
See, United States v. Martin, 562 F.2d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[W]ith four agents guarding the
terminal baggage area, there was obviously little likelihood that the suitcase could have been
moved. ... )
15 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). But see United States v. Martin, 562 F.2d
673 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Chief Judge Bazelon cautioned that, "the inherent mobility of the object to
be searched cannot, without more, justify a failure to secure a warrant. The question in each
case . . . is whether, in light of the 'realities of the situation,' there was a reasonable likelihood
that the item would be moved before a warrant could be obtained." 562 F.2d at 678 (emphasis in
original).
1 The inconvenience of guarding or securing the property to be searched with a special
detachment of law enforcement personnel while a warrant is being obtained and the nature of the
property to be searched, e.g., whether it is contraband, have been mentioned as factors bearing
on the issue of the presence of exigent circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
462(1971). However, these considerations have been discredited in later cases. UnitedStatesv.
Martin, 562 F.2d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (search warrant required for dangerous contraband);
United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
17 United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 585-86 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Shye, 473
F.2d 1061, 1064-65 (6th Cir. 1973). The urgent need to identify and apprehend in these cases has
outweighed the fact that the object to be searched was immobile and in the exclusive control of
the police.
's See note 22, infra.
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usually required. 9 Similarly, exigent circumstances were found not to exist
where luggage at a transportation terminal was secure, the suspect was
identified and a sufficient number of agents was available.20 However, where
the probable cause was obtained only a short time before the warrantless
search and the time required to appear before a magistrate involved a
possible risk of loss of the items sought, sufficient exigent circumstances were
found to be present.2'
The availability of a search warrant via telephone or other electronic
means obviates much of the claimed exigency justification for a warrantless
search for objects. As one court has stated, the determination of whether
exigent circumstances exist "commands that analysis be shaped by the
realities of the situation . 2.."22 The reality, under Rule 41(c)(2), is that a
search warrant is usually only a phone call away. Administrative obstacles
heretofore cited for not securing a search warrant by appearing before a
magistrate must now be examined in a different light. Such factors as the
distance from a magistrate, the time required to appear before a magistrate,
the normal business hours of a magistrate, the inconvenience of securing and
dispatching additional agents to appear before a magistrate are now less
determinative in justifying the exception. A magistrate, and a search
warrant, can be as close as the nearest telephone or mobile radio. The
mobility, and thus the risk of loss, of the object to be searched and property to
be seized is reduced in importance. A typical two-person investigative team
can "secure" the object of the search with minimized concern for the custodial
status or location of the suspect. Even the exigency of an immediate need to
search to identify and apprehend suspects is compromised. This conclusion
was reached by one court which "wrestle[d] with the troubling question of
when the police may rely on the indeterminate exception permitting [a]
warrantless search in case of exigency."2
11 This situation is characterized as a potential exigency, rather than a present exigency.
United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Robinson, the court justified
waiving the necessity of a search warrant in a potential exigency case by weighing the mitigating
factors: "a grave offense; a clear showing of probable cause; reasonable belief that the suspects
are armed; a likelihood that the suspects will escape if not speedily apprehended, and peaceable
entry." Id., at 583. See note 17, supra, and Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385,392-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (en banc).
20 United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 673,674 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (suspect identified only as "a man
named Jerry").
21 For example, in Thomas v. Parett, 524 F.2d 779,781 (8th Cir. 1975), probable cause was
obtained at 2:00 p.m. and the search was conducted shortly after 2:15 p.m.; and in United States v.
Ogden, 485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1973) it seems that the search was conducted immediately after the
federal agent obtained probable cause.
22 United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also United States v.
Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1978), in which it is said that, "[o]rdinarily exigency does
not evolve from one single fact. Indeed, we are often confronted with a mosaic - no one part of
which is itself sufficient."
A district court's finding of exigent circumstances will not be disturbed unless it is clearly
erroneous. 573 F.2d at 1357. The use of this standard has been sanctioned in United States v.
Bradshaw, 515 F.2d 360,365 (D.C. Cir. 1975) and United States v. Gargotto, 510 F.2d 409,411 (6th
Cir. 1974).
23 United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578,585 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Prior to the enactment of
Rule 41(c)(2) the Robinson court suggested the use of telephonic search warrants:
A quite different matter, addressed not to the police officers so much as to the Police
Chief and the responsible legal officers in this jurisdiction, is the possibility in case of
[Vol. 27:35
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In determining whether to permit an exception to the constitutional
mandate for the use of search warrants, courts will now be less willing to
accept excuses for not securing a warrant in "emergency" situations. Given
the reluctance of courts to carve out and expand exceptions to the
requirement for search warrants, prosecutors will have to go much further to
demonstrate sufficient exigency to justify the constitutionality of a warrantless
search.
II. SEARCH FOR OBJECrs - SUPERVISORY PowER
Not only has the availability of a telephonic search warrant under Rule
41(c)(2) changed the equation for exigent circumstances for constitutional
purposes, but non-use of this procedure also presents an independent basis
for the exclusion of evidence obtained in a warrantless search - the
supervisory power of the federal courts over the administration of criminal
justice. Federal courts have enforced compliance with the requirements of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure through the use of this supervisory
power. A clear statement by the Supreme Court of the existence and extent
of supervisory power in connection with the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was long ago announced.
A federal agent has violated the Federal Rules governing searches
and seizures - Rules prescribed by this Court and made effective
after submission to the Congress. . . .The power of the federal
courts extends to policing those requirements and making certain
that they are observed ...
To enjoin the federal agent from [utilizing the fruits of an illegal
search] is merely to enforce the Federal Rules against owing
obedience to them. The obligation of the federal agent is to obey
the Rules. . . .They prescribe standards for law enforcement.
2 4
The supervisory power is exercised by both federal circuit and district
courts.25 This supervision extends to federal criminal prosecutions as well as
to investigations involving searches by federal agents and United States
Attorneys conducted prior to the filing of a complaint, or absent an indictment
emergency of obtaining warrants based on sworn oral testimony communicated by
telephone or other appropriate means, with procedures for recording, transcribing and
certifying the statement.
Id.
24 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1955). The Supreme Court has also used its
supervisory power to enforce other provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943),
the Court excluded confessions given during an unreasonable delay in taking an arrestee before a
judicial officer in disregard of FED. R. CusM. P. 5(a).
25 "The Federal [sic] judicial system contemplates supervision by the Federal (sic] district
courts of the nation over the government attorneys and enforcement officers acting within their
districts, a supervisory jurisdiction possessed in turn on review by the several courts of appeals
and ultimately by the Supreme Court." Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810,816 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 125 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (exclusion of search
evidence by a district court through the exercise of its supervisory power). Accord, United
States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218, 1223 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 338
(1974); Silbert v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 765, 766-67 (D. Md. 1967).
1978]
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1978
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:35
being handed down by a grand jury.26 The federal courts' supervisory
authority can even extend to bar the testimony of a federal agent in a state
prosecution where a search by federal agents is in violation of Rule 41.27
When the exigency of a situation is questionable, and the telephonic search
warrant procedure is not used, persuasive grounds can be advanced for a
court to invoke its supervisory power to exclude search evidence. This is
particularly true where there has been communication via telephone between
the agents on the scene and a prosecutor. Often, in conformity with policy,
agents will telephone a federal prosecutor to review the circumstances of the
imminent search and obtain verbal authorization. This is critical where a
search is conducted in a claimed exigent situation without a telephonic search
warrant because, in a word, if there was time to call the prosecutor there was
time to call a magistrate.
There are policy arguments to support the use of a telephonic search
warrant. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 41(c) (2) state that the rule
was enacted to make it administratively feasible for federal investigative
agents and attorneys to obtain search warrants where time, distance and other
factors make it difficult to appear before an issuing magistrate .2  This is a
judicial as well as a congressional2 9 statement of policy to encourage the use of
search warrants.
26 "This independent anomalous jurisdiction extends to federal law enforcement officers who
have failed to observe standards for law enforcement established by federal rules governing
searches and seizures." United States v. Rapp, 539 F.2d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1976) (emphasis
added).
See also Mayo v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 119,122 (E.D. Ill. 1977), in which the court stated
that, "District Court [sic] jurisdiction under Rule 41(e) is supervisory in nature and derives from
the inherent authority of Courts[sic] over those who are its officers. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1974)."
27 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). Rea had first been indicted in federal court where
the illegally obtained evidence, which was the basis of the state court action, had been
suppressed. In DeMaria v. Jones, 416 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the court suggested that Rea
is limited to cases involving a violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by federal
agents. Cf. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961) (evidence admitted -no prior federal court
action and no allegation of illegal arrest or search).
This injunctive relief may only be applicable when a federal court has previously ruled on the
legality of a federal search in connection with a federal indictment or a ruling on a motion for
return of property under Rule 41(e). United States v. Navarro, 429 F.2d 928, 930-31 (5th Cir.
1970).
The search need not be conducted exclusively by federal agents in order to have the federal
supervisory power applied. All that is required is that a federal agent "had a hand in it." Lustig
v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949). See, Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d 315, 316-18
(5th Cir. 1968).
2s See note 4, supra.
29 S. REP. No. 354,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
527, 533-35, wherein the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that:
[t]he committee agrees with the Supreme Court that it is desirable to encourage Federal
[sic] law enforcement officers to seek search warrants in situations where they might
otherwise conduct warrantless searches by providing for a telephone search warrant
procedure with basic characteristics suggested in the proposed Rule 41(c)(2). As the
Supreme Court has observed, "It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law
enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants whenever reasonably
practicable."
While proposed rules and amendments to existing federal court rules are nominally the
responsibility of the Supreme Court, they are, of course, actually drafted by committees within
the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id. at 4, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 528. The
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To further facilitate their use, the judiciary has administratively caused the
formulation and distribution of interim guidelines to assist magistrates and
judges in the development of local court plans and procedures for applying
the telephonic search warrant procedure. 30  The guidelines suggest that
procedural and policy questions be discussed among magistrates, United
States Attorneys and law enforcement personnel. They require district court
plans to provide for a magistrate to be "on call" at all times to receive calls for
search warrants, and for prosecutors to be a party to the telephone
conversation. The guidelines further recommend criteria for establishing the
need to dispense with written affidavits. The criteria appear to have been
formulated with the exigent circumstances exception in mind.31 Although
these are only guidelines for magistrates and judges, and are not binding on
agents or prosecutors, they do demonstrate judicial preference for the use of
search warrants.
There is also an executive expression favoring the use of telephonic search
warrants. The Department of Justice has issued directives to the United
States Attorneys concerning the availability and use of the Rule 41(c)(2)
procedure. 32 The Department of Justice has taken the position that the
"implementation of a Federal [sic] search warrant system will not only be an
effective enforcement tool but will provide further safeguards to the
constitutional rights of all Americans." 33  Like the Administrative Office
Guidelines, the Department of Justice has encouraged participation by
prosecutors in the telephone conferences to obtain a search warrant. It has
also suggested that Assistant United States Attorneys be "on call" to receive
requests from agents for telephonic search warrants. The Department of
Justice has also urged that meetings among magistrates, prosecutors and
enforcement personnel be convened to discuss policy and procedure.
Thus, there are sufficient policy expressions favoring the use of this new
rule authorizing telephonic search warrants was drafted by the Advisory Committee on Criminal
Rules. It was then approved, in order, by the following bodies: the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Supreme
Court, and Congress. A method of congressional approval of proposed rules and amendments is
provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976).
30 Memorandum from William E. Foley, (then) Deputy Director, Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts to all federal judges, U.S. magistrates, circuit executives, clerks of court, and federal
public defenders. (Sept. 20, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Sept. 20, 1977]. The
memorandum was authorized by the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of
the Federal Magistrates System.
3' 4. Demonstrating Need for Dispensing With a Written Affidavit
Criteria should be developed in each court to determine when and under what
circumstances the telephonic procedure is acceptable. While conditions will vary from
court to court, examples of such criteria could include the following:
(a) The agent cannot reach the magistrate in his office during regular court hours;
(b) The agent making the search is a significant distance from the magistrate;
(c) The factual situation is such that it would be unreasonable for a substitute agent,
who is locatel near the magistrate, to present a written affidavit in person to the
magistrate in lieu of proceeding with a telephonic application;
(d) The need for a search is such that without the telephonic procedure a search
warrant could not be obtained and there would be a significant risk that evidence
would be destroyed.
Memorandum of Sept. 20, 1977, supra note 30.
32 Memorandum from Benjamin R. Civiletti, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, to holders of U.S. Attorney's Manual, Title nine, "Federal Telephone Search
Warrant System" (Sept. 15, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Sept. 15, 1977].
3 Memorandum of Sept. 15, 1977, supra note 32.
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procedure. Federal agents and attorneys can be shown to be fully aware of
its availability. Non-use may be in disregard of the policy of the Department
of Justice or of a particular investigative agency. All of these considerations
are relevant to a motion to suppress based on the court's supervisory power.
34
To support suppression on supervisory, or constitutional grounds, an
evidentiary hearing would be necessary to develop the factual basis. The
agents and attorneys involved in deciding whether to telephone for a search
warrant in a given situation would be necessary fact witnesses. Their
knowledge of the availability of such a search warrant, 35 as well as their
knowledge of agency and Department of Justice policy regarding their use,
would be material. 36
Consistent with the nature of federal supervisory power, empirical data
concerning the frequency of use, or non-use, of telephonic search warrants in
a particular jurisdiction, or nationwide, would also be relevant to the issues
raised in an evidentiary hearing. Statistics on the incidence of use by judicial
district are readily available. Strikingly, they have not been used frequent-
ly.
3 7
Not all failures to follow the various requirements of Rule 41 will result in
suppression of search evidence on non-constitutional grounds; however,
some will. 38 The courts have employed various tests to determine whether
the suppression remedy is appropriate for a failure to follow a particular
requirement of Rule 41: was the provision intentionally and deliberately
disregarded and if the rule had been followed might the search not have
occured or not have been so abrasive; 39 or, was the procedural requirement
34 Investigative agency regulations, manuals, and guidelines must be made available to the
public under the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1970). They are
also subject to subpoena under FED. R. Cimi. P. 17(c). See, e.g., United States v. Leichtfuss,331
F. Supp. 723, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1971), in which the court ruled that directives or memoranda of the
Selective Service System as well as the Selective Service Form Manual are subject to disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act. But, the subpoena provision of FMD. R. CnrM. P. 17(c)
may not be used for purposes of conducting a fishing expedition. See, United States v. Moore,
423 F. Supp. 858, 860 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
35 A knowing and deliberate disregard of a provision of Rule 41 will allow the court to invoke
its supervisory power and suppress the evidence gained thereby. United States v. Burke, 517
F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975). See, notes 39 & 40, infra, and accompanying text.
[V]iolations of Rule 41 alone should not lead to exclusion unless (1) there was
"prejudice" in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been
so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and
deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule. (emphasis added).
Id.
This test has also been applied in United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Burgard, 551 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1977). See also, United States v. McKenzie,
446 F.2d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 1971) (requiring a showing of prejudice).
36 Intentional disregard of agency guidelines has resulted in suppression in other areas.
United States v. Caceres, 545 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1976), (violation of IRS regulations on
consensual monitoring required suppression). See also, United States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295
(9th Cir. 1975). "An agency of the government must scrupulously observe rules, regulations, or
procedures which it has established. When it fails to do so, its action cannot stand and courts will
strike it down." United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811 (4th Cir. 1969).
37 From October, 1977, to September, 1978, a total of 23 telephonic search warrants were
issued nationwide. The figures may be obtained from the Magistrates Division, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.
3' Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1955). See note 24, supra.
39 United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975).
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designed to assure that federal agents act "reasonably" in conducting
searches? 40
Some of the provisions of Rule 41 are merely ministerial requirements
defining the proper officer to execute a search warrant, or requiring the return
of an inventory. However, since section (c)(2) bears directly on the
reasonableness of the action of federal agents, it cannot be construed as a
ministerial requirement. Knowledge by federal agents and attorneys of the
availability of telephonic search warrants and their non-use in a claimed
exigent situation might meet the test of being intentionally and deliberately
disregarded. This would be particularly true where there was prior
telephonic contact between the agents and prosecutor. A more compelling
showing of exigency than has been heretofore sufficient will be required.
III. SEARCHES FOR PERSONS
The availability of a telephonic search warrant also has impact on exigent
circumstances in connection with the issue of whether a search warrant is
required to enter a private dwelling to search for and arrest a person for whom
there is an arrest warrant, or where there is probable cause to believe that a
person committed a crime. At first blush, this appears to be essentially an
issue dealing with the requirements of an arrest warrant and therefore Rule
41(c)(2) would be inapplicable as by its terms it deals only with search
warrants. Arrest warrants are covered in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which does not presently include a provision for
securing an arrest warrant from a magistrate via telephone or other
appropriate means. 41
However a closer examination indicates that the availability of a
telephonic search warrant does affect the law on arrests to a degree. The
Supreme Court has decided that the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause 42
40 United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973). "The proper test to be applied is
whether a particular Rule 41 standard is one designed to assure reasonableness on the part of
federal officers, or whether the provision merely blueprints the procedure for issuance of federal
warrants." Id. at 44.
At issue in Sellers was the admissibility in a federal prosecution of evidence obtained jointly
by federal and state personnel under a state-issued search warrant. The court assumed for
purposes of argument that the federal involvement was sufficient to render the search a federal
one. The warrant had been issued on a showing of probable cause that a violation of state law
had been committed, and the appellant contended that evidence obtained under a state warrant
was inadmissible in federal court because FED. R. CraM. P. 41 governs federal warrants and
requires that they be issued only for violations of federal law. See United States v. Brouillette,
478 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1973).
The court found that despite the participation of federal officials the warrant had been issued
under the authority of state law. Therefore, "every requirement of Rule 41 is not a sine qua non to
federal court uses of the fruits of a search predicated on the warrant...," and the evidence
obtained under the state warrant was admissible in the federal prosecution. United States v.
Sellers, 483 F.2d at 43.
The test applied in Sellers was criticized in United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377,387 n.15 (2d
Cir. 1975), although the court conceded that in most cases both the Burke and Sellers tests would
produce the same result.
41 If probable cause may be transmitted electronically to support a search warrant there
appears to be no reason why it cannot likewise be transmitted to support an arrest warrant under
FED. R. CuM. P. 4.
42 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
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does not require an arrest warrant to arrest a person in a public place, 43 nor is
an arrest warrant required when an agent is in "hot pursuit" from a public
place into a private dwelling44 and has probable cause to believe that the
person pursued has committed an offense. The Court has left unanswered
the question of whether, absent exigent circumstances, a "warrant" is required
to arrest in a private dwelling. 45
Two circuits have held that, absent exigent circumstances, agents with
probable cause for a felony arrest must obtain a warrant before entering a
dwelling to make an arrest.46 The question persists, however, if a warrant is
required, what kind of warrant - search, arrest, or both - is needed. Some
decisions assume, without specifically addressing the issue, that an arrest
warrant will suffice. 47 Other courts have suggested that a search warrant is
required to enter, at least a third party dwelling, to search for and arrest a
person believed to be inside.4  Still another has said that the "distinction
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
'3 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Interestingly, the opinion of the Court,
delivered by Justice White, fails to mention the phrase"public place" as a limitation on the ability
of an officer to make a warrantless arrest. Rather, the opinion deals exclusively with the
requirement of probable cause as a precondition to a warrantless arrest. It was left to the
concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Stewart to explain that an officer who had probable
cause could constitutionally make a warrantless arrest in a public place; the constitutionality of a
warrantless arrest in a private place was not decided in Watson. Id., at 426-27 (concurring
opinion, Powell, J.), 433 (concurring opinion, Stewart, J.).
In a later case, however, Justice Rehnquist explained that Watson had held that "the
warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place upon probable cause did not violate the
Fourth Amendment." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976).
44 United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976). See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967).
4, The Warrant Clause speaks of "persons" and "seizures" and does not delineate between
search and arrest warrants. See notes 42 & 43, supra.
46 United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Reed, 572
F.2d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 1978).
Several courts have undertaken an enumeration of the factors which constitute "exigent
circumstances." Generally, however, they rely upon those developed by Judge Leventhal in
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385,392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc). See note 19, supra. The
Second Circuit is one of those courts. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d at 1350.
Both Dorman and United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978) failed to address
the specific issue decided by Prescott and Reed because of the presence of exigent circumstances.
4' United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, (2d Cir. 1978) (appeal pending); United States v.
Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976). See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d
385, 396 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
48 This is the position taken by the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928 (3d Cir. 1974):
This Court [sic] has made clear, however that arrest warrants are not substitutes for
search warrants. . . .Although police have warrants for the arrest of suspects, they
may enter premises, at least of third persons, to search for those suspects only in exigent
circumstances where the police officers also have probable cause to believe that the
suspects may be within.
Gereau reiterated the stance taken earlier in the same year in Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333 (3d
Cir. 1974). In Fisher, the court had declared that "a warrant for the arrest of a suspect may
indicate that the police officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime; it
affords no basis to believe that the suspect is in some stranger's home." Id., at 341. Contra, United
States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1017 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[a] search warrant was not necessary to
execute an arrest warrant on the premises of a third party. ... ).
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between a search warrant and an arrest warrant is an artificial one" as long as
the warrant describes "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." 49 Although the Supreme Court has not met this issue, Mr. Justice
Powell raised it in United States v. Watson.50
Traditional interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause
supports a conclusion requiring a search warrant to enter a private dwelling to
arrest another. Even those courts that have said a search warrant is not
necessary have, nevertheless, required the police to have probable cause that
the arrestee was in the dwelling.51 Whenever a probable cause determination
has been required, it has been a judicial preference to have a magistrate, and
not the police, make the determination of sufficiency. The privacy interests
involved in a search of a dwelling to arrest are significantly greater than those
involved in an arrest in public. The intrusion, in an entry to search for a
person, is equal to the intrusion in an entry to search for objects.5 2 These
arguments for requiring a search warrant, absent exigent circumstances, to
enter and search a private dwelling in order to arrest have been recognized.
Citing the need for a probable cause determination by a magistrate when a
wanted person is presently within a private dwelling, a proposal has been
made to amend Rule 41 to include "person" within the "objects" for which a
search warrant may be used.53
49 United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1978). The Prescott court felt that
this distinction was unimportant as long as the "warrant" described the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. Yet, this qualification applied by the court belies one of the
fundamental differences between arrest and search warrants. A search warrant under Rule 41,
either telephonic or upon written affidavit, must contain a description of the property being
sought and the persons or places to be searched. FED. R. CiaM. P. 41(c)(1), (2)(E). How-
ever, arrest warrants under FED. R. Cam. P. 4 require no such description.
It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that the Prescott court would, if deciding this precise
issue, require that a search warrant be issued. This would be preferable to judicially amending
the arrest warrant requirements to include such a description.
50 "[W]e do not today consider or decide whether or under what circumstances an officer
lawfully may make a warrantless arrest in a private home or other place where the person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy." 423 U.S. 411,432-33 & n.7 (concurring opinion, Powell, J.)
(emphasis added). See note 43, supra.
-' United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1017 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d
419 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
5-2 "A magistrate's disinterested determination that governmental intrusion is warranted is no
less desirable when the policeman's quarry is a suspect, rather than a piece of evidence." United
States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir. 1978).
' Rule 41. Search and Seizure
(a) AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WARRANT. A search warrant authorized by this rule
may be issued by a federal magistrate or a judge of a state court of record within the
district wherein the property or person sought is located, upon request of a federal law
enforcement officer or an attorney for the government.
(b) OBJECTS WHICH MAY BE SEIZED WITH A WARRANT. A warrant may be
issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property that constitutes evidence of
the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things
otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended for use or which is
or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense; or (4) person for whose
arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully restrained. (emphasis in original).
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PRocEDuRE (Feb. 1978). The corresponding Advisory Committee Notes contain a discussion of
the authority and rationale supporting this amendment.
The ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § ss 210.3(1)(d) (Proposed Official
Draft 1975) also includes "an individual for whose arrest there is reasonable cause" as an
authorized object of a search warrant.
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If a search warrant is required to enter a private dwelling in order to arrest,
the exigent circumstances exception comes into play. If the circumstances
are sufficiently exigent, a search warrant will not be required to enter a private
dwelling to search for a person where there exists probable cause to believe
that that person committed a crime. Accordingly, the availability of a
telephonic search warrant under Rule 41(c)(2) must be considered.5 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts are reluctant to apply an exclusionary rule, whether as a remedy to
enforce a constitutional mandate,5 5 or to give effect to criminal procedural
rules by use of supervisory power.56 But they are not anxious to expand
judicially-fashioned exceptions to the constitutional requirement for search
warrants.5 7  They have, however, recognized the need on occasion to
conduct warrantless searches, as in the exigent circumstances exception.
In light of the enactment of Rule 41(c)(2), the exigent circumstances
exception requires that new standards be applied prior to the recognition of
such an exception. The usual factors contributing to an exigent circumstance
exception, such as the lapse of time in obtaining a traditional search warrant
and the unavailability of a magistrate or judge, are no longer sufficient to
justify the exception. A search warrant, under Rule 41(c)(2), is now only a
phone call away. A warrantless search will require a more compelling
showing of exigency than has previously been required. Moreover, Rule
41(c)(2) has given federal courts additional grounds to exclude evidence
obtained in a warrantless search. Non-use of a telephonic search warrant
may invoke the supervisory power of the federal courts to enforce
compliance with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In addition, the judiciary has manifested its preference for the use of
telephonic search warrants in its decisions,'5 through its rule-making
authority,59 and administratively. 60 The inevitable conclusion must be that
the availability of this method of obtaining a search warrant has changed the
equation for determining the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause.
54 An amendment to Rule 41 to authorize a search warrant for "persons" would also provide
support for suppression of the fruits of such a search for failure to use Rule 41(c)(2), as an exercise
of the court's supervisory power. See notes 24-40, supra and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1977).
57 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). See note 5, supra.
58 United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See note 23, supra.
51 FED.R.CRiM.P. 41(c)(2). See notes 1 & 29, supra and accompanying text.
60 See notes 30-31, supra.
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